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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did a delay of five months between artest and trial, caused by 
the prosecution, violate appellant Miller's right to a speedy 
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double jeopardy by reversing its order to dismiss the aggravated 
assault charge? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
LEONARD G. MILLER 
Defendant/Appellant 
Cajse No. 860335 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE fcASE 
The Appellant, Leonard G. Miller}, appeals from judgment and 
convictions of retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, a 
second degree felony, aggravated assault,! a third degree felony and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 9, 1985, the appellant, Mr. Leonard Miller, was 
involved in a fight with one Ralph Robinson. Mr. Miller was issued 
a citation for simple assault and ordered to appear in Fifth Circuit 
Court, West Valley Division, to answer changes on November 18, 
1985. Mr. Miller failed to appear. A b^nch warrant was issued for 
his arrest. 
On December 4, 1985, Leonard Miller allegedly walked into e 
Food-4-Less grocery store in West Valley City, picked up a case of 
beer and a carton of cigarettes, and walked out the door without 
paying for them. (R. 81). The assistant manager, David K. Bennion, 
observed Mr. Miller, followed him out the door into the parking lot 
and confronted him. (R.82) Upon not receiving a satisfactory 
answer to his request to see a receipt, Mr. Bennion asked Mr. Miller 
to accompany him back into the store. (R. 83). Mr. Miller 
refused. (R. 84) At this point, Mr. Bennion grabbed Mr. Miller by 
the arm and began pulling him toward the door. (R. 84). Mr. Miller 
then put the beer and cigarettes on the ground and pulled a hunting 
knife from a scabbard he was wearing on the outside of his belt. 
(R. 84-85). Mr. Miller told Mr. Bennion that he would not go into 
the store, but that he would return the beer and cigarettes. (R. 
85). The knife was out about 20 seconds. (R. 93). Mr. Miller did 
not make pay thrusting movements (R. 92) nor any verbal threats. (R. 
92). He merely refused to go with Mr. Bennion and returned the 
knife to its scabbard when Mr. Bennion let go of him. (R. 92). Mr. 
Bennion then picked up the beer and cigarettes and returned them to 
the store. (R. 93). Mr. Miller thanked Mr. Bennion for letting him 
go, and left the premises (R. 93). Upon his return to the store, 
Mr. Bennion called the police. (R. 87). Witnesses to the incident 
noted Mr. Miller's automobile license number, turned it over to Mr. 
Bennion who turned it over to the police. (R. 86-87). The police 
arrested Mr. Miller at his home, that evening, (R. 107) took him 
back to the store where Mr. Bennion identified him. (R. 108). Mr. 
Miller was then booked into county jail. 
On December 6, Mr. Miller was charged, by the state with 
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one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and one 
count of retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, a hunting 
knife, a second degree felony. The case r^ umber assigned was 
85-1692. (See Addendum A). 
On December 6, 1985, Mr. Miller was taken from the County 
Jail in the Circuit Court in West Valley $nd arraigned on the simple 
assault charge arising out of the fight wjLth Ralph Robinson on 
November 9. Pre-Trial Conference was setjfor January 7, 1986. (R. 
10). 
On December 17, 1985, a preliminary hearing was held before 
Judge Gibson in Fifth Circuit Court on the two felony charges 
arising out of the shoplifting incident that occured on December 4, 
1985. Mr. Miller was bound over on thosej two changes for trial in 
Third District Court. (R. 2). 
On December 20, 1985, an information was filed against Mr. 
Miller by West Valley City, charging one count of simple assault, a 
misdemeanor. The name of the victim was David K. Bennion, the 
victim in the shoplifting incident that occured on December 4, 
1985. The police report referred to was 85-29842, the report filed 
in the shoplifting incident. However, th|e date of the incident was 
listed as November 9, 1985, the date of the fight with Mr. 
Robinson. Also, the place the incident occurred was listed as 1476 
West Parkway, the place the fight occureq with Mr. Robinson. 
Pre-Trial was set for January 7, 1986. (jsee Addendum B). 
On January 3, 1986, Mr.Miller was arraigned before Judge 
Judith Billings in Third District Court qn the two felony charges 
arising out of the shoplifting incident. Mr. Miller pled not 
guilty. Trial was set for February 13, 3J986. 
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On January 7, 1986, Mr. Miller was taken from the County 
Jail to a pre-trial conference before Judge Burton in West Valley 
City. (R. 10). The information upon which the proceedings were 
held was the information charging simple assault against David K. 
Bennion, police report 85-29842; in short, the shoplifting case. 
(See Addendum B). Upon the advice of counsel, Mr. Miller pled 
guilty in a plea bargain arrangement to the lesser included offense 
of disorderly conduct. (R. 11). Mr. Miller was sentenced to twenty 
days and credited for time served. (R. 11). Believing that the 
shoplifting incident against David Bennion was resolved, Mr. Miller 
moved to dismiss the two felony charges, arising out of the same 
incident, pending in Third District Court. 
On January 9, 1986, the Salt Lake County Prosecutor's 
Office filed a second information against Mr. Miller arising out of 
the shoplifting incident. This information was filed for the 
purpose of adding the charges of aggravated robbery in the 
alternative to retail theft, and possession of a weapon by a 
restricted person. Case number assigned was CR86-500. (See 
Addendum C) (R. 18). 
On January 31, 1986, a hearing on the defense motion to 
dismiss the original charges brought against Mr. Miller as a result 
of the shoplifting incident, case number 85-1692, was held before 
Judge Billings. Believing, as did Mr. Miller and, at the time, the 
prosecutor, that the West Valley simple assault charge against David 
Bennion, filed December 20, 1986, arose out of the same criminal 
episode, she held that the aggravated assault felony was resolved by 
Mr. Miller's plea of guilty to disorderly conduct. (See 
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Addendum D). The State was thus barred fforn prosecuting Mr. Miller 
on aggravated assault. The retail theft charge wasf however, left 
intact. (See Addendum D). 
On February 13, 1986, a preliminary hearing was held before 
Judge Noel in Fifth Circuit Court on the second information. Judge 
Noel delayed bind over pending the resolution of a state motion to 
reconsider the Order of Dismissal of the Aggravated Asssault 
Charge. (R. 131). 
On February 21, 1986, the prosecution filed a motion to 
reconsider the Order of Dismissal. (See Addendum E). A hearing was 
held on April 2, 1986. (R. 128). The prpsecution asserted that the 
information filed in West Valley on December 20, charging simple 
assault against David Bennion, on the basis of a police report on 
the shoplifting incident, was in actuality, the simple assault 
against Ralph Robinson which occured November 9. (R. 135). Thus, 
asserted the prosecution, Mr. Miller did 
disorderly conduct as to the shoplifting 
not plead guilty to 
incident, but pled guilty 
to the assault arising out of the fightirjg incident with Ralph 
Robinson. (R. 135-138). The prosecutor (offered the possible 
explanation that a clerk erred in entering the wrong name of the 
victim. (R. 139). However, no evidence, other than the assertion 
of the prosecutor was introduced to show that the December 20 West 
Valley information was intended to charge a crime arising out of 
fight with Ralph Robinson, rather than a crime arising out of the 
shoplifting incident with David Bennion. (R. 128-148). 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Billings reversed 
her order to dismiss the aggravated assault charge. (R 145). She 
allowed the State to choose which information it would proceed 
under, the original information filed December 6, CR- 86-1692, or 
the second one with added charges filed January 7, CR- 86-500, 
pending before Judge Noel in Fifth Circuit Court. (R. 146). The 
same chose to proceed with the second information and dismissed the 
first. (R. 148). 
On April 3, 1986, Judge Noel bound Mr. Miller over for 
trail in Third District Courton the second information. (R. 2). 
Mr. Miller was arraigned before Judge Billings on April 11, 1986. 
(R. 21). Trial was held on May 5, 1986. (R. 72). Mr. Miller was 
convicted of retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, a second 
degree felony, aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony. (R. 27-30). Mr. Miller was sentenced on May 30, 
1986. (R. 38-40). 
The time from the arrest of Mr. Miller to his trial was 
five months. Mr. Miller was unable to obtain bail and was thus 
incarcerated in the County Jail for the entire period. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Leonard Miller was arrested on December 4, 1986 and tried 
on May 5, 1986. He was incarcerated for the entire period in the 
county jail. The delay between arrest and trial, under the facts of 
this case, constitutes a denial of Leonard Miller's right to a 
speedy trial. The delay was of sufficient length to trigger 
analysis of the Barker v. Wingo standard adopted by this Court in 
- 6 -
s of the lengthy pretrial 
it caused^ but because it 
State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah, 1979 H The delay was caused by 
clerical error, by law enforcement authorities, and by an 
unnecessary refiling of charges alleging £ new crime which the facts 
of the incident clearly did not support. Mr. Miller expressed his 
concern and frustration with the delays at trial. (R. 75-76). In 
addition, Appellant Miller was substantially prejudiced by the 
unreasonable incarceration in the County Ljail for five months, not 
only because of the inherent oppresivenesss 
incarceration and the significant anxiety! 
effectively added an additional five months to the amount of time he 
otherwise would have served, under the Board of Pardons policy of 
not allowing credit for time served priori to trial. 
In considering the four factors of the Barker test, 
I 
appellant Miller contends that the circumstances, taken as a whole, 
show that his right to speedy trial was Violated. 
In addition, Mr. Miller contends that the trial court 
violated his right against double jeopardy by reversing its order to 
I 
dismiss the aggravated assault charge. As shown by Mr. Miller in 
his hearing on the motion to dismiss, he jhad already pled guilty to 
a lesser offense of simple assault, charged by West Valley City on 
an inforamtion listing the victime as Dayid K. Bennion. (R. 9) Mr. 
Miller contends that West Valley City charged him with misdemeanor 
assault arising out of the shoplifting incident. He further 
contends that his plea of guilty to the iesser included offense of 
disorderly conduct barred the state from prosecuting on aggravated 
assault. The trial judge erred in merely accepting the assertion of 
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the county prosecutor that the West Valley information intended to 
charge assault arising from a totally separate incident, and that 
the name of the victim and police report cited as basis were the 
result of clerical error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DELAY OF FIVE MONTHS BETWEEN ARREST AND 
TRIAL, CAUSED BE THE PROSECUTION, VIOLATED 
MR. MILLER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
The Sixth Amendement to the U. S. Constitution provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . ." 
The United States Supreme Court has declared this right 
"fundamental" and therefore enforceable upon the States by operation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopper v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 
213, 222-223 (1967). Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides a similar guarantee, supported by legislative enactment of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6(1)(f). 
The right to a speedy trial is recognized as "one of the 
most basic . . . preserved by our constitution." Klopper, at 226. 
The function of this fundamental right is "to protect those accused 
of a crime against any possible delay, caused by either willful 
oppression, or the neglect of the state or its officers." People 
v. Wilson, 383 P.2d 452, 458 (1963). In Utah, "the speedy trial 
right reserved under the Utah Constitution is no greater or lesser 
than its federal counterpart." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1378, (Utah, 1986). 
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The United States Supreme Court jLn Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514 (1972) articulated a four prong balancing test to determine if a 
defendant has been denied a speedy trial. Length of delay, the 
reason for delay, defendant's assertion or the right to a speedy 
trial, and prejudice to the defendant are all factors to be 
considered. However, no factor is to be qonsidered as a necessary 
or sufficient prerequisite to a claim. The four are related factors 
and must be considered together with such other circumstances that 
may be relevant. The Utah Supreme Court adopted this test in State 
v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
The United States Supreme Court held that there is "no 
constitutional basis for holding that thd speedy trial right can be 
quantified into a specific number of day^ or months." Barker at 
523. The length of delay that is necessary to trigger inquiry into 
the other factors is a matter for the states to determine and that 
"because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length 
of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent 
upon the peculiar circumstances of the c^se." Barker at 530-531. 
I 
In gauging whether the delay is excessive, the Court in Barker 
indicated that the complexity of the change is a primary factor. 
Ordinary street crimes will necessarily tolerate less delay than a 
I 
complex conspiracy charge. Barker at 53f. 
Other guidance as to when delay becomes presumptively 
prejudicial and thus subject to the Barker analysis is given by the 
Utah Legislature and this Court. Perhaps most persuasive, and most 
applicable under these facts, is the guarantee of Utah Code Ann. 
77-l-6(h). According to this statute, at\ accused who cannot make 
bail is entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment. This 
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30 day period has been held to be a statutory implementation of the 
right to a speedy trial under the Utah Constitution. State v. 
Rasmussen, 418 P.2d 134, (Utah, 1966). While this 30 day period is 
not mandatory, it is directory, and should be given substantial 
weight by this Court. State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah 1979). 
In the instant case, Mr. Miller was unable to post bail. His 
arraignment on the first information was held before Judge Billings 
on January 3, 1986. (R. 137). Yet, because of delays caused by the 
prosecution, trial was not held until May 5, 1986. (R. 72). 
Appellant Miller thus contends that Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6(g) 
should weigh heavily in determining whether his right to a speedy 
trial was violated. 
Further guidance is given by Utah Code Ann. Section 
77-29-1. According to that statute, a trial must be brought within 
120 days after a demand for disposition of detainers is filed by a 
prisoner. This Court has held that the 120 day period represents a 
legislative expression of the time limits that constitute a speedy 
public trial, under these circumstances, under the Utah 
Constitution. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985). Mr. 
Miller's delay was substantially longer. In addition, this Court 
has previously employed a Barker analysis triggered by a delay of 
three and a half months between arrest and trial. State v. Knill, 
656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1982). Appellant contents that a delay of five 
months between arrest and trial for an ordinary street crime is 
sufficient delay to trigger a Barker analysis. 
According to Barker, the length of the delay is 
analytically closely related to the reason for delay. Differing 
weights are assigned to varying reasons for the delay. For example, 
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purposeful delay on the part of the greatest weight. However, 
"negligence . . . should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless 
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than the 
defendant." Barker at 531. 
In the instant case, the five mojith delay between arrest 
and trial was caused entirely by the law Enforcement authorities. 
First, the law enforcement authorities erred either by listing the 
wrong date and place on the West Valley information, as contended by 
the defendant, or by listing the wrong victim and police report as 
contended by the prosecution. (R. 139). | (See Addendum B). These 
errors caused all the confusion which led! to the motion to dismiss, 
the order to dismiss, the motion to reconsider the order to dismiss 
and the reversal of the order to dismiss,j all of which unreasonably 
delayed the trial. At the motion to dismiss the aggravated assault 
charge, all the parties, the Judge, the defendant and the 
prosecution, proceeded upon the belief that the West Valley 
Information was West Valley City's effort to prosecute a charge 
arising out of the shoplifting incident.! (R. 115-126 ). However, 
the trial on the remaining retail theft Charge was delayed by the 
prosecution's filing of a motion to reconsider based upon their 
interpretation of the clerical errors. 
In addition to delays caused byjthe negligence of the law 
enforcement authorities, delay was also caused by the filing of a 
second information after Mr. Miller had been arraigned, went througt 
preliminary hearing and was bound over ti> Third District Court on 
the first information. The primary reason for filing the second 
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information was to add the charge of aggravated robbery, (R. 125). 
A charge wholly unsupported by the facts of the incident and found 
so by the trial court. (R. 27-30). This required that another 
preliminary hearing be held before Judge Noel in Fifth Circuit Court 
on February 13, 1986, the date originally scheduled for trial on the 
first information. (R. 4) Yet more delay was caused because Judge 
Noel was forced to delay his decision to bind over for trial until 
Judge Billings was able to rule on the prosecution's motion to 
reconsider dismissal of the aggravated assault charge, (R. 131), a 
motion necessitated by its own errors. 
Judge Billings rendered her decision on April 2, (R. 145). 
Judge Noel bound Miller over Eor trial on April 3. (R. 2). Trial 
was finally held on May 5, (R. 72) a full five months after Miller 
was arrested and approximately three months after Miller's original 
scheduled trial date. All during this time Mr. Miller was 
incarcerated in county jail, confused and frustrated by delays 
caused by prosecutorial errors and insistence upon overcharging. 
The next factor in the Barker analysis is the defendant's 
assertion of his right to a speedy trial. As held in Barker, " a 
defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that 
duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent 
with due process. Moreover, . . . Society has a particular interest 
in bringing swift prosecutions, and society's representatives are 
the ones who should protect that interest." Barker at 527. The 
Court reasoned that a doctrine which demands "that a defendant 
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waives any consideration of his right to ^ speedy trial for any 
period to which he has not demanded a tri&l" is unconstitutional. 
Id. at 526. 
"Such an approach, by presuming Waiver of a 
fundamental right from inacMon, is inconsistent 
with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of 
constitutional rights. The Court has defined 
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 
1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 146 ALR 357 (1938). 
Courts should "indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver," Aetfia Ins. Co. v. 
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 81 L. Ed. 1177, 1180, 
57 S. Ct. 809 (1937), and they should "not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental 
rights." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. public Utilities 
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 1103, 
57 S. Ct. 724 (1937)." 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 526, (1972). 
For these reasons the Court rejected the notion that a 
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial, forever waives his 
right. _Id. at 528. Instead, "the better rule is that the 
defendant's assertion or failure to assert his right to a speedy 
trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the 
deprivation of the right." _Id. at 528. 
held that "the defendants assertion of his speedy trialright is 
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the 
defendant is being deprived of that righti." j^ 3. at 531-532. 
I 
The Baker Court held that the nature of the speedy trial 
right is such that it is impossible to pinpoint the precise time in 
the process when the right must be asserted. Jj3. at 527. In the 
instant case, counsel for Mr. Miller raided the issue of the delay 
in his opening statement at trial. (R. 75-76). He voiced his 
client's frustration with the avoidable delays attributable to the 
However, the Court also 
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prosecution, and brought to the Court's attention that his client 
waited approximately six months in jail as a result of the 
prosecutions actions. (R. 75-76) Mr. Miller contends that these 
comments clearly reflect his concern that his rights were violated 
by the prosecution and that they serve as an effective assertion of 
his right to a speedy trial for Barker analysis purposes. 
The last step in the Barker analysis is to evaluate the 
prejudice to the defendant. Under Barker, "prejudice should be 
assessed in light ofthe interests of defendants which the speedy 
trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified 
three such interests: i) to prevent oppressive pre-trial 
incarceration; ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; 
and iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be 
impaired." J^ d. at 532. 
Regarding the first of the above interests, Barker 
expresses concern that the obvious societal disadvantages of 
unreasonable pre-trial incarceration are even more serious for the 
accused who cannot obtain his release. Barker at 532. The 
detrimental impact of such incarceration is felt by the individual 
through the resulting loss of employment, disruption of family life, 
the enforcement of idleness, and the curtailment of rehabilitation. 
Id. The anxiety and concern of the accused caused by the delay 
between accusation and trial has long been recognized as central to 
the reason for the existence of the speedy trial right, United 
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), and virtuallly mandates the 
conclusion that a defendant is always prejudiced by such delay. 
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In the instant case, the accused^ Mr.Miller, was 
incarcerated for the entire period between arrest and trial. (R. 
75-76). Mr. Miller contends that the five month pre-trial 
incarceration under the cloud of confusion uncertainty and 
frustration caused by the prosecution in this case, was oppressive 
and caused him significant anxiety and concern. 
Mr. Miller contends that he was klso strongly prejudiced 
because he will not be credited for this pre-trial incarceration 
period in serving his sentence. According to Policy No. A09/12 of 
the Utah Board of Pardons, the Board will not grant credit for time 
served by an offender, other then time served by an offender 
commited to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to a guilty, but 
mentally ill conviction, or incarceration while undergoing 
diagnostic evaluations. UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
MANUAL, No. A09/12, June 2, 1986. (Addendum F). Under this policy, 
the prosecution has the power to enhance |a prisoners sentence by 
unreasonably delaying the prisoners trial through negligence or by 
design. In the instant case, Mr. Miller1 s trial was unreasonably 
delayed by the prosecution through negligence and recharging. Mr. 
Miller contends that he was especially prejudiced by this delay 
because, under official Board of Pardons (policy, it is significantly 
added to his term of incarceration. 
Because the facts of this case nieet the four part Barker 
analysis, Appellant Miller asks this Courjt to find that his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, reverse the 
convictions below, and dismiss the charges. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT MILLERS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN REVERSING 
ITS ORDER TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGE 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that no person shall: "be subject for the same offense to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The United States 
Supreme Court has declared the right against double jeopardy to be 
"fundamental" and thus incumbent upon the states by operation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland/ 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides a similar 
guarantee, supported by legislative enactment of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 77-1-6(2)(a) which states that "no person shall be put twice 
in jeopardy for the same offense." 
According to Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-402(3), a 
defendant may not be convicted of an offense, if he has already been 
convicted of a lesser included offense arising out of the same 
criminal episode. Mr. Miller was charged on December 20, with 
simple assault upon David K. Bennion in West Valley City. (R. 9). 
The basis for the charge was listed on the information as police 
report 85-29842, a report which described a December 4 shoplifting 
incident involving Mr. Miller and David Bennion. (R. 9). However, 
Mr. Miller was also charged with aggravated assault upon David 
Bennion by the State. The basis for the charge, listed in the 
probably cause statement, was police report 85-29842, the same 
police report used as the basis for the West Valley charge. (R. 9) 
This Court has held that simple assault is a lesser 
included offense of aggravated assault. State V. Hunter, 437 P.2d 
208 (Utah 1968). Mr. Miller pled guilty to disorderly conduct, a 
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lesser included offense of simple assault* on the West Valley 
information. (R. 11). Believing, therefore, that the guilty plea on 
the West Valley charge barred the State from prosecuting on the 
aggravated assault charge, Mr. Miller moved to dismiss that charge. 
The motion to dismiss was granted. (See addendum D). 
On April 2f 1986, a hearing to reconsider the order for 
dismissal was held. (R. 128-148). The ptosecution merely asserted, 
without presenting evidence, that West Vajley in fact intended to 
prosecute Mr. Miller for a simple assault against one Ralph 
Robinson, arising out of a fighting incident that occured on 
November 9, 1985. (R. 128-148). The prosecution asserted, with no 
evidence, that West Valley had not intended to prosecute Mr. Miller 
on an assault charge arising out of the shoplifting incident; that 
the listing of David Bennion as the victim, and the listing of 
shoplifting police report, as the basis of: the charge, was a 
clerical error. (R. 139). The date listed on the West Valley 
information was the date of the fight witp Ralph Robinson. (See 
Addendum B) (R. 6-9). The place listed was where the fight took 
place. (See addendum B)(R. 6-9). However, the Court did not 
consider the more reasonable interpretatibn that the date and place 
were a result of clerical error, rather t|han the name of the victim 
and police report. (R. 128-148). 
Another factor apparently ignored by the trial court was 
the date the West Valley information was issued. The fight with 
Ralph Robinson occured on November 9, 1985. (R. 6-8). Mr. Miller 
was ordered to appear and answer the charjge on November 18, 1985. 
He failed to appear. A bench warrant wa^ issued 
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for his arrest. On December 6, 1985 he was taken before Judge 
Burton and arraigned on simple assault charges against Ralph 
Robinson. Pre-trial was setf at that time for January 7, 1986. (R. 
10). The only reasonable interpretation is that West Valley 
intended to do exactly what the information says on its face: 
charge simple assault as against David Bennion, arising out of the 
shoplifting incident. 
All of these factors combined to give Mr. Miller and his 
counsel a reasonable bonafide belief that they had resolved at least 
the assault charge against David Bennion. Mr. Miller served his 
sentence on that charge in the county jail. (R. 11) Yet, based 
upon the mere assertion of the Salt Lake County Prosecutor that West 
Valley had not intended to prosecute the shoplifting incident, the 
trial court allowed the state to try Mr. Miller again for assault on 
Mr. Bennion. Mr. Miller was convicted and sentended to 0 to 5 years 
on that charge. (R. 40). Mr. Miller contends that this is a clear 
violation of his right against double jeopardy, guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. For this reason, Mr. Miller 
asks that his conviction on the charge of aggravated assault be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Miller contends that under the Barker analysis, 
adopted by this Court, his right to a speedy trial was violated. 
According to Barker, the only remedy available is dismissal of the 
charges. Barker at 522. Appellant therefore asks that this Court 
find that his right to a speedy trial was violated, reverse the 
lower Courts conviction and order that the charges be dismissed. 
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In addition, Mr. Miller contends that his right against 
double jeopardy was violated by the trial courts reinstatement of 
the aggravated assault charge against David Bennion, inasmuch as he 
had already been convicted, and served his sentence on a West Valley 
City prosecution of a lesser included chatge arising out of the same 
criminal episode. For this reason, Mr. Miller asks that the 
conviction on the aggravated assault charge be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this VZ^ day of February, 1987. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four copiep of the above Appellantfs 
Brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this / C__ dax of 
February, 1987. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED by 
of February, 1987. 
this day 
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ADDENDUM A 
T.L. "TED" CANNON ( 
Salt Lake County Att-arney 
By: JEFFREY THORPE 
Deputy County Attorney , . 
3839 South West Temple, Suite 1-A,;1 ", 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 w " LAKE 
Telephone: (801) 264-2260 ft'ftwil 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SJTATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER AKA 
LEONARD G. MILLER 
DOB 9-30-52 -, 
Defendant(s). 
Sc 
As 
reened by: THORPE 
signed to: 
BA^ IL -frsttrvrr^lD,^ 
.TO 
iifr 
INFORMATION 
Criminal,No 
5 F ^2871 
The undersigned, Det. Paul Jacobsen, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crime of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 4, 1985, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, LEONARD GEORGE MILLER AKA 
LEONARD G. MILLER, a party to the offense, did make a threat to do 
bodily injury to David K. Bennion, accompanied by an immediate show 
of force or violence, and did use a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury; 
COUNT II 
RETAIL THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 4, 1985, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the I defendant, LEONOARD GEORGI 
MILLER AKA LEONARD G. MILLER, a party to the offense, did take 
possession of, conceal, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried 
away or transferred, merchandise displayed, held, stored, or offeree 
for sale in a retail mercantile establishment, to-wit: Food-4-Less, 
such merchandise consisting of one case of beer and one carton of 
cigarettes, and that said defendant didj so with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the irttent to permanently deprive 
said merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise, 
without paying the retail value of such! merchandise, to-wit: undei 
$100.00, and that said defendant was ar$ied with a deadly weapon a 
the time of the theft, to-wit: a hunting Jcnife; 
Continued to Page! 2. 
"'*iV 
FORMATION 
* a t e v . LEONARD MILLER 
rPage 2 . 
8 OFS < 28'71 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: Based upon West Valley Police Department 
Report Case No. 85-029842, which details that the defendant, Leonard 
George Miller, at the above date and location, took possession of 
one case Budweiser Beer and one carton Marlborough cigarettes from 
the display area of a Food-4-Less Store and left the store with this 
merchandise without paying the retail value of such merchandise. 
When the defendant was stopped by a store clerk, David K. Bennion, 
and was questioned as to why he did not pay for said merchandise, 
the defendant pulled a deadly weapon from his belt, to-wit: a black 
handled hunting-type knife, and used the knife in a threatening 
manner against the store clerk which allowed him to make an escape 
from the store premises. The defendant was apprehended and returned 
to the store by police officers later that night at which time he 
was identified by the store clerk as the person who had committed 
the above offenses. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Simpson 
Officer Fluckinger 
Det. Paul Jacobsen 
David K. Bennion 
Food-4-Less c/o David Bennion 
Ted Elder 
Subscribed "antl^^c^n to before me 
this / # 4%?"**£;;Pfeg^mber, 1985. 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
T.L. "TED" CANNON, County Attorney 
y^fyuyiir\ttoTT\£) 
ADDENDUM B 
r 
y 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, 8TATB OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUKTY 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
F1LED IN CLERK'S OFHCE Salt Lake Coun|y, Utan &H 
fc C& Vr 
V S . 
MILLER, LEONARD G 
1631 Wes t 2700 S o u t h 
Wes t V a l l e y C i t y , 
mOB:< J39/30/56 
UT 
W&i $ ^H-ftw De fendant ." $%,^ 
INFGBmTIGN 
Clerk
 g 
85 CRWV 5 5 3 5 ' 
<~>->#;T^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
Coun ty of S a l t Lake ) 
De t e c t i v e s . Coxey, wveft V64 of W<pst Valley City, in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above-named 
defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown, of West Valley City, 
the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah, on 9 November 1985 , at 
14 7 6 Wes t Parkway I , West Valley City, in the Coun 
of Salt Lake and State aforesaid, unlawfully did dommit the public offense of VIOLAT-
ING A CITY ORDINANCE, as follows, to-wit: Count 1 - Defendant used 
u n l a w f u l force and v i o l e n c e towards 
. V'V:; ? 
-•^f'H.V. *-'• ; ' * • 
David K. R e n n i o n . 
• • • » 
•
e 
contrary to the provisions of Section(s) Count 1 - 1 3 -5 -1 02 ; ASSAULT 
of Revised Ordinances of West Valley City, in suc^ h cases made and provided* 
Complainant 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ^ dayQf December 
P_R£JRIAL 1 /7 /86 KS 10 :00 C i r c u i t Cour t Judge 
ADDENDUM C 
I9S6 JAN - S 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
By: DAVID S. WALSH 
Deputy County Attorney. 
Courtside Office Building^ 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ^TATE OF UTAH ,. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. o> 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER 
DOB 09/30/52, 
Defendant(s). 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Screened by: 
Assigned to: 
D S Walsh 
D S Walsh 
BAIL Summons 
INFORMATI 
mons 
<J86FS 5ca? 
riminal No. 
The undersigned Jacobson - WV^D under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED 
in 
RETAIL 
ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
3500 South, 
December 4 
1500 West 
or about u^s-v *,*,. -,, 
6, Section 302, Utah 
that the defendant, 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a party to the offense, unlawfully 
and intentionally took personal property in the possession 
of another from the person or immediate presence of another, 
against 
knife; 
his will, by the use of i knife or a facsimile of 
THEFT, a 
Salt Lake 
1985, 
Utah 
OR 
Second 
County, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
Degree Felony* at 1500 West 3500 South, ir 
State of Utahj, on or about December 4, 
76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1), 
amenjded, in that the defendant, 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a party | to the offense, did take 
possession of, conceal, carry away, transfer or cause to bt 
carried away or transferred, merchandise displayed, held, 
stored, or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establish-
in violation of Title 
Code Annotated 1953, as 
(Continued on page Two) 
|6FS so^s 
ment, to-wit: Food-4-Less, such merchandise consisting of 
beer and cigarettes, and that said defendant did so with the 
intention of retaining such merchandise or with the intent 
to permanently deprive said merchant of the possession, use 
or benefit of such merchandise, without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise, and defendant k&$—fcwiec—be-en 
c<Mwiited of HAefX; CAJJI^O^^I <5?V. ^fr**m jUJ*^-^^—, 
COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about December 4, 
1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a party to the offense, assaulted 
David K, Bennion, by threatening to do bodily injury to 
David K. Bennion accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, by the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife; 
COUNT III 
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Third Degree 
Felony, at 1500 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on or about December 4, 1985, in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, a 
party to the offense, did have in his possession a dangerous 
weapon, to-wit: a knife, while on parole for a felony; 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Simpson Fluckinger Paul Jacobsen David K Bennion Ted Elder 
Kevin Kenna 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Based upon West Valley Police Department report case 85-29842 which 
details that the defendant, Leonard George Miller, on or about 
December 4, 1985 at approximately 1720 at 1500 West 3500 South, West 
Valley City, took possession of 1 case Budwiser beer and 1 carton 
Marlborough cigarettes from the display area of Food-4-Less store 
and left the store with this merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise. When the defendant was stopped by a 
store clerk, David K« Bennion, and was questioned as to why he did 
not pay for said merchandise, the defendant pulled a deadly weapon 
from his belt, to-wit: a black handled hunting-type knife, and used 
(Continued on page Three) 
P^ORMATION 
ETATE V. LEONARD GEORGE MILLER 
County Attorney #85-1-68354 
Page Two 
PlNFORMATlON 
STATE v. LEONARD GEORGE MILLER 
County Attorney #85-1-68354 
Page Three 
the knife in a threatening manner against the store clerk which 
allowed him to make an escape from the store premises. The 
defendant was apprehended and returned to the store by police 
officers later that night at which time he was identified by the 
store clerk as the person who had committed the above offenses. 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CR-85-1692 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss cftme before the Court on 
January 31, 1986. The defendant was represented by James Valdez, 
Esq. , and the State was represented by Dave Walsh, Esq. The 
Court took the matter under advisement, to review the legal 
authorities submitted, and is prepatfed to enter its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as incorporated in this Memorandum 
Decision. 
FACTS 
This matter arises out of a single criminal episode occurring 
on December 4, 198 5 in West Valley City, Utah. The defendant 
was charged with assault, a misdemeanor, in the West Valley 
Circuit Court. According to the statements of counsel for the 
defendant, and uncontroverted by the State, the defendant, as 
a result of plea negotiations, pled guilty to disorderly conduct 
as a lesser included offense of assault. The defendant was 
subsequently charged as a result of the same criminal episode 
STATE V, MILLER PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
in the Third District Court with aggravated assault and retail 
theft, both charges being felonies. Defendant brings this Motion, 
arguing that the aggravated assault charge in the District Court 
should be dismissed in view of the fact that the defendant has 
pled guilty to a lesser included offense thereof. 
OPINION 
I. Lesser Included Offense 
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-1-402(3), states: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charge but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged 
and the included offense. An offense is 
so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all of the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged. . . . 
The above statutory provision clearly states that a defendant 
may not be convicted of an offense if he has already been convicted 
of a lesser included offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode. 
In Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained when an offense is a lesser included 
offense of a greater charge. 
The rule as to when one offense is included 
in another is that the greater includes 
a lesser one when establishment of the greater 
would necessarily include proof of all of 
the elements necessary to prove the lesser. 
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Conversely, it is only when the proof of 
the lesser offense requires some element 
not involved in the greater offense that 
the lesser would not be an included offense. 
Id, at 29 (quoting State v. Brennan. 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 
27 (1962)). 
The defendant was charged in Circiiit Court with assault, 
a misdemeanor. After plea negotiation$, the defendant agreed 
to plead guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct as a lesser 
included offense of the misdemeanor assault charge. To allow 
the State to now argue contrary to what they stipulated to in 
the Circuit Court would frustrate the pie* agreement. 
The question which must be answered, therefore, is whether 
or not the defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of a 
lesser included offense of the aggravated assault charge brought 
in the District Court. Utah Code Ann., Section 76-5-103 (1953) 
sets forth the elements of aggravated assault, and states that: 
"A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault" 
and also engages in certain conduct in addition to that assault. 
In view of the definition of a lesser included offense set forth 
in the Farrow case quoted above, it appears clear that assault 
is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault inasmuch 
as the commission of aggravated assault necessarily includes 
all of the elements of common assault. The Utah Supreme Court, 
in State v. Hunter, 20 Utah 2d 284, 437 P.2d 208 (1968), expressly 
held that simple assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
assault. It follows, therefore, that the disorderly conduct 
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charge, being a lesser included offense of simple assault, is 
in turn a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. The 
defendant, therefore, pursuant to Section 76-1-402, Utah Code 
Ann. , cannot be lawfully convicted of the greater aggravated 
assault charge inasmuch as he has already been convicted of 
a lesser included offense arising out of a single criminal episode. 
II. Retail Theft Charge 
The defendant is also charged in this Court with a retail 
theft charge, a second degree felony. Although the oral arguments 
of counsel were unclear, it appears necessary to address the 
issue of whether or not this charge may be properly brought 
in the District Court after the defendant was convicted in the 
Circuit Court on the assault/disorderly conduct charge. Utah 
Code Ann., Section 76-1-402(2) states that: 
Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote 
justice, a defendant shall not be subject 
to separate trials for multiple offenses 
whens 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction 
of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned 
on the first information or indictment. 
At the time of oral argument on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
counsel for the State brought the above provision to the attention 
of the Court, and argued that it did not preclude, and offered 
case law to the effect that it did not preclude additional proceed-
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ings on the retail theft charge in th^ District Court under 
the circumstances of the present matter. It is unclear whether 
or not defense counsel was making such bbjection, but inasmuch 
as counsel for the State felt it necessary to handle such issue, 
the Court will also briefly address that issue. 
At first blush, Section 76-1-402(2) suggests that all of 
the charges against the defendant arising out of the single 
criminal episode must be brought in a tingle trial. Although 
the District Court had jurisdiction of all of the offenses charged 
here, the defendant had the right to keep the misdemeanor assault 
charge in the Circuit Court, and the District Court was powerless 
to take the matter from the Circuit Cou^ rt. State v. Sosa, 598 
P. 2d 342, 344 (Utah 1979). Furthermore, the Circuit Court did 
not have any jurisdiction over the felony retail theft charge, 
and therefore could not dispose of that matter. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that Section 76-1-402(2) d0es not require a single 
trial where the separate charges could nojt be brought or handled 
in a single court, as is the case here. State v. Sosa, 598 
P.2d 342, 344 (Utah 1979). Defendant chose to plead to the 
misdemeanor assault charge in the Circuit Court, as it was his 
right to, and thereby precluded the District Court from handling 
the matter. On the other hand, the felony theft charge brought 
in the District Court could not have been handled in the Circuit 
Court. To interpret Section 76-1-402 so a$ to allow the defendant 
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to force the disposition of a misdemeanor in the Circuit Court 
and thereby escape prosecution for a felony arising out of a 
single criminal episode would be a complete frustration of justice. 
The felony retail theft charge against the defendant, therefore, 
may be properly brought in the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant cannot be tried for the aggravated assault 
charge in the District Court inasmuch as he has already been 
convicted of a lesser included offense. The defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss as to the aggravated assault charge is, therefore, 
granted. The felony retail theft charge, however, is still 
a viable charge and is properly brought in this District Court. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to the remaining felony retail 
theft charge, therefore-is denied. 
Dated this 0 day of February, 1986. 
JUBITTH M. BILLINGS / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM E 
T. L. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DWID S. WALSH 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v 
LEONARD GEORGE MILLER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COURT ORDER. 
Criminal No. CR 85-1692 
Honl Judith M. Billings 
COMES now the State of Utah and moves this Court to reconsider its 
Order dismissing portions of Case No CR 85-1692. This Motion is based upon the 
grounds that the defendant misrepresented certain facts to this Court at the 
time of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the defendant has 
represented that this case was pled from a simple assault to a disorderly 
conduct. In fact, there were two assault charges filed against the defendant. 
The first charge, and one which was handled by Ithe West Valley City Attorney, 
occurred on 9 November 1985 at 1476 West Parkway. A second assault charge, the 
one pending before this Court, was an aggravated assault which occurred on 
Decenber 4, 1985, at 1500 West 3500 South in Wejst Valley City. 
Defendant has represented that there was only one charge, when in 
fact, there were two. The City Attorney had ifio authority to bind the State 
and in fact made no representation that he was binding the State. The defendant 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER COURT ORDER 
CR 85-1682 
Page 2 
has attempted to mislead this Court and the State by revealing only half the 
truth. 
WHEREFORE, the State of Utah prays that this Court hold a hearing at 
which these matters may be more fully explored and a fair and proper resolution 
reached. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <z?' day of FEBRUARY, 1986. 
ADDENDUM F 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 
Number: 
Title: 
Authority: 
A09/12 Date: June 2, 1986 Page 1 of 2 
Granting Credit for Time Served 
Utah Code Annotated 77-27-5 
Utah Code Annotated 77-27-9(3) 
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-404 
Utah Code Annotated 77-35-21.5 
Attorney General's Opinion Dated October 26, 1978 
Purpose: To establish the Board of Pardons * policy on granting credit for 
time served prior to commitment to ttye prison. 
Policy: It is the policy of the Board of Paipdons to grant an offender 
credit for time served prior to commitment to prison only as 
required by state law. j 
Credit will be given for all time served by an offender 
committed to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to a "guilty and 
mentally ill" conviction. Credit v^ ill also be given for up to 
180 days served by an offender while undergoing diagnostic 
evaluations. 
No other time served while awaitinfe trial and sentencing or as a 
condition of probation prior to commitment to prison will be 
credited toward an individual's sentence. 
Original Issue Date: 
5294C 
Revision Date: 
